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A B S T R A C T
What is the best way to deploy solar energy to maximize clean energy growth while equitably sharing beneﬁts? A
promising model is community shared solar, which enables energy consumers to purchase shares of electricity
generated in an oﬀsite project. Noting how diﬀerent states and utilities have approached program design, we
explore how design decisions aﬀect access to solar and the equity of cost and beneﬁt sharing. We conclude with a
set of questions for future research.
1. Introduction
The challenges associated with broadening access to technology and
equitably distributing costs and beneﬁts in the transition to sustain-
ability is a growing area of scholarship (Anadon et al., 2016). Within
this context, the rapid deployment of solar energy is seen as a key
strategy to mitigate climate change and reduce other environmental
impacts of energy use (IEA, 2016). In the United States, solar energy
adoption is growing rapidly, but as of 2015, solar comprised less than
1% of national electricity generation (EIA, 2017). While the hardware
costs of solar have dropped considerably in the past decades, large-scale
solar deployment presents a signiﬁcant ﬁnancing challenge, as the
majority of lifetime costs associated with solar deployment are upfront
costs incurred at the time of construction. As a result, innovation in
“ﬁnance and business solutions to expand access to capital” is a major
focus of public policies to address the non-hardware costs1 of installing
solar power (U.S. Department of Energy, n.d.).
One promising approach to addressing solar energy’s ﬁnancing
challenges is community shared solar (CSS) programs.2 CSS programs
are now mandated by legislative policies in at least 15 states (and the
District of Columbia) and have been voluntarily adopted by an in-
creasing number of electric utilities. Traditionally, solar deployment
has required either centralized planning for large, utility-scale project
development or for energy customers to own or ﬁnance single solar
projects located on their own property. In contrast to traditional
models, CSS programs allow multiple electricity consumers, often in
close geographic proximity, to collectively ﬁnance an oﬀsite, cen-
tralized solar project by purchasing shares or subscriptions to power
generated by the project. Participants who ﬁnance the development of a
CSS project receive compensation for electricity generated by their
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share in the project, typically through so-called “virtual net metering”
(VNM) schemes. VNM allows subscribers to receive economic returns
for electricity sold to a utility generated from the share of the solar
project to which they are subscribed.
CSS programs are generally supported for their potential to increase
the rate of solar deployment and expand opportunities to ﬁnance solar
energy more aﬀordably (Chwastyk and Sterling, 2015; National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2014). First, relative to rooftop in-
stallations, CSS projects can lower average costs of solar energy by
capturing economies of scale and by targeting more desirable project
sites (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2014). Second, CSS
programs may be made inclusive to customers who may not otherwise
be able to access solar, creating an opportunity to address existing in-
equities in the energy system. Third, because they pool together many
consumers, CSS programs are amenable to aﬀordable ﬁnance models,
thereby creating the potential to address existing inequities in the en-
ergy system for customers currently prevented from having their own
solar systems (Funkhouser et al., 2015; National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, 2014; Stanton and Kline, 2016). Finally, CSS programs may
provide unique opportunities for community-level mobilization of re-
sources (Schroederet al., 2016), which could enable niche-level tech-
nology adoption as part of a larger-scale energy transition (Geels and
Schot, 2010).
In this paper, we explore the diversity of CSS program design op-
tions and discuss the key tensions in existing programs. We highlight
three critical design choices: the ownership model for CSS projects, rate
design to compensate CSS project developers, and subscriber enroll-
ment. Then, we turn to a discussion of how CSS programs may have
equity implications that diﬀer from alternative models of deploying
solar energy. Finally, we conclude by sketching out key unanswered
questions that we believe should be addressed by future research.
2. Design considerations in community shared solar
CSS programs aim to achieve two related objectives: (a) increase the
overall level of solar energy deployment, and (b) broaden access to the
beneﬁts of adopting solar energy (Chwastyk and Sterling, 2015;
Funkhouser et al., 2015). By expanding the market for solar energy
adoption to electricity customers who cannot self-ﬁnance solar projects,
CSS programs potentially double the number of residential and com-
mercial electricity customers who can access solar energy (Feldman
et al., 2015; National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2014). And by
creating new opportunities for consumer-ﬁnanced solar deployment,
CSS programs potentially lower the balance of costs for deploying new
solar energy.
As states and utilities consider adopting or reforming CSS programs,
it is critical to build on the experience of the electric utilities and states
that have been early adopters. No two CSS programs are identical
(Augustine and McGavisk, 2016; Coalition for Community Solar Access,
2016; Interstate Renewable Energy Council, 2016), and this hetero-
geneity in program design enables a useful context to learn about the
impact of various CSS program design features.
2.1. CSS program design choices
Taxonomies of CSS program design choices have been proposed by
several diﬀerent groups. Chwastyk and Sterling (2015), writing for the
non-proﬁt Solar Electric Power Association, identify “12 key decisions”
that deﬁne a CSS program. A recent study by researchers at Princeton
University identiﬁes nine characteristics that deﬁne a CSS program
(Chang et al., 2017). Writing in this journal, Augustine and McGavisk
(2016) propose a taxonomy of ﬁve program design considerations. We
brieﬂy summarize Augustine and McGavisk’s ﬁve considerations here,
supplementing their taxonomy with elements from the broader litera-
ture:
1) Ownership model: projects within a CSS program may be owned by
a utility, a third party, a special-purpose entity created by a utility or
by customers, or a charitable nonproﬁt. Ownership models have
direct implications on how a project is ﬁnanced.
2) Subscription model: CSS programs may allow customer participa-
tion through oﬀers to buy or lease solar panels, invest a ﬁxed
amount in the system, or buy energy or capacity. Within these dif-
ferent models, customer payments may be upfront, paid over the
course of the contract, or credited on monthly electric bills.
3) System and site selection: CSS programs may allow developers to
site projects in speciﬁc locations or more generally, and may have
speciﬁc rules regarding grid interconnection, power purchasing, net
metering, and other aspects of rate design and developer compen-
sation.
4) Subscriber enrollment: CSS programs vary in how they recruit
subscribers. Some engage in extensive community engagement,
outreach, and marketing campaigns, while others will use existing
channels between a utility and their customers. Subscriber enroll-
ment may have certain restrictions or additional incentives for
certain customer types, such as low- to moderate-income (LMI)
customers.
5) Program management: Over the lifetime of a CSS project, operations
and maintenance must be performed and bill and subscription
management must be carried out (e.g. managing unsubscribed
electricity and subscriber attrition). Programs vary in their im-
plementation of these functions and which actors bear responsibility
for these functions. Program management may also include con-
sumer protection, data reporting, and regulatory compliance.
In the taxonomy of CSS program design choices presented above,
several key features have emerged as being particularly important in
overall program performance. Here we highlight three issues for deeper
exposition: ownership model, rate design, and subscriber enrollment
(note: rate design is an element of “system and site selection” in
Augustine and McGavisk’s taxonomy). We note however, that even if
every aspect of program design is considered in the creation or eva-
luation of a CSS program, one must recognize that each of the decisions,
“is made within the context of the greater regulatory and utility regime,
and can aﬀect one another” (Chwastyk and Sterling, 2015).
2.1.1. Ownership model
Program designers must take into account the utility structure in
every context where CSS operates. CSS is inherently ﬂexible and
therefore oﬀers diﬀerent beneﬁts to the utility and customer
(Funkhouser et al., 2015; Trabish, 2017). The most common diﬀer-
entiation in the literature is between utility-owned and third-party-led
programs (Coughlin et al., 2011), although special-purpose entity (SPE)
ownership models and non-proﬁt models have also been implemented.
Here we present tradeoﬀs between these diﬀerent ownership models,
extending the comparison by Augustine and McGavisk (2016).
In utility-administered programs the utility is in charge of every
aspect of CSS construction, interconnection, design (subject to con-
straints by the legislature), operation, and billing. These programs are
more likely to occur in vertically integrated, regulated utilities than in
deregulated states (Stanton and Kline, 2016). Smaller municipal uti-
lities, and electric cooperatives have generally begun their foray into
CSS through programs of less than 500 kW and contract out speciﬁc
support services (billing, operations, maintenance) (Chwastyk and
Sterling, 2015). In several states, electric cooperatives were the early
adopters of CSS, and oﬀered a combination of up-front and pay-as-you-
go payment options. This earlier experience in some states appears to
have inﬂuenced the wider adoption of CSS programs, including through
legislation. Larger investor-owned utilities (IOUs) may begin with a
pilot program but generally have larger programs of over 20 MW
(Chwastyk and Sterling, 2015). Finally, utility-led programs tend to use
virtual net metering where the participant receives a credit for their
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portion of the solar project (Coughlin et al., 2011).
The beneﬁts to utilities in utility-led programs may be signiﬁcant.
The utility maintains control over the distributed generation project,
demand continues to pass through the utility, renewable energy credits
can be retained and retired against the utility’s RPS where applicable,
and the utility can improve relations with its ratepayers (Funkhouser
et al., 2015; National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2014). The utility
would also qualify for rebates, incentives, and the modiﬁed accelerated
cost recovery system (MACRS) and may also be able to more readily
take advantage of federal and state tax credits, all of which can reduce
the costs of developing the CSS project. These beneﬁts could in theory
be indirectly passed on to subscribers, but whether or not beneﬁts ﬂow
to subscribers depends on program design (Coughlin et al., 2011).
In third-party or non-utility-SPE programs, CSS project developers
partner with utilities to develop, manage, and maintain the solar array,
assign subscribed generation or capacity to utility accounts, or sell their
electricity to the utility through a power purchasing agreement (PPA)
(Chwastyk and Sterling, 2015; Coughlin et al., 2011). The utility is
charged with facilitating the billing, interconnection, and management
of the distribution system (Trabish, 2017). These programs have pro-
liferated in regulated states with larger IOUs and through legislated
shared solar policies, as in Colorado and Minnesota. Non-proﬁt third-
party CSS developments have also emerged where the project is wholly
owned by the subscribers. Though few in number, they have been
successful in developing CSS models that more actively include LMI
subscribers (Chwastyk and Sterling, 2015; Louwagie, 2017). These
ownership models may encounter diﬃculties with capturing the full tax
beneﬁts, as non-proﬁts and customer SPEs may not have access to a tax-
equity partner.
As opposed to utility-led programs, third-party programs diminish
the value to the utility that administers the program. The utility either
signs a PPA with a special purpose entity or works with a developer by
administering the program (Chwastyk and Sterling, 2015; Coughlin
et al., 2011). In both cases, the utility does not own the solar array. This
is an important consideration when creating a program, given the ex-
tent to which the utility could resist such infringements into its territory
by third party developers – either directly or indirectly (such as de-
laying the interconnection process in the case of vertically integrated
utility territories). The relative opaqueness, cost, and length of the
siting and interconnection process can increase the uncertainty for
developers and ﬁnanciers, and slow the speed of program rollout. States
that have caps on net metering project sizes in addition to limits on how
much energy production can be credited “increase the risk and may
slow or halt solar project development,” if developers are uncertain
about whether or not their development will qualify (National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2014). Additional legislation may be
required to facilitate such development (Stanton and Kline, 2016). Fi-
nally, third-party-led programs may still qualify for rebates, incentives,
and MACRS that can be retained by the developer or once again passed
onto participants indirectly (Coughlin et al., 2011).
2.1.2. Rate design
Rate design and the customer subscription oﬀer are arguably the
most essential aspects of designing a CSS program that meaningfully
increases the deployment of solar. The most common ways of crediting
CSS developers are tariﬀs based on virtual net metering (Chang et al.,
2017; Funkhouser et al., 2015; National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
2014). A stable, transparent, and appropriate tariﬀ lowers the ﬁnancial
risk that ﬁnanciers see with CSS by increasing the predictability of re-
turns (Chang et al., 2017).
Like net metering schemes for other forms of distributed energy
generation, tariﬀs paid to CSS subscribers through VNM schemes vary
and may be above, equal to, or below retail electricity rates. CSS pro-
grams face unique challenges in tariﬀ design, as projects can have
signiﬁcantly greater capacity than other third-party-owned and oper-
ated solar facilities on the grid. As such, there has been experimentation
in tariﬀ design in the context of VNM for CSS programs. For example,
the legislatively mandated CSS program for the state’s largest investor-
owned utility in Minnesota has been one of the ﬁrst tariﬀ programs (for
any form of power generation) to adopt a value-of-solar compensation
scheme (Miller, 2016; Taylor et al., 2015).3
2.1.3. Subscriber enrollment
Subscriber enrollment with CSS programs has proved to be a chal-
lenge in some, but not all, CSS programs. Where subscriber acquisition
has been a barrier to CSS deployment, utilities and developers have
often underestimated the time and cost of marketing the program
(Augustine and McGavisk, 2016). Barriers to subscriber enrollment can
stem from the unfamiliarity of CSS programs for customers and the
entrance of third-party entities into the middle of utility-customer re-
lationships.
In terms of customer acquisition, experience with CSS programs has
pointed to a tradeoﬀ between the number of subscribers needed to fully
subscribe a CSS project and the risk of under-subscription (Chwastyk
and Sterling, 2015). In order to counter some of this risk, many pro-
grams and developers, especially in immature markets, have opted for
contract lengths between 20 and 25 years, despite customer preferences
being between 5 and 10 years (Chwastyk and Sterling, 2015; Stanton
and Kline, 2016; Trabish, 2017). Customers may balk at such long
commitments if appropriate transfer options are not in place. But cus-
tomer screening may also be occurring in other ways.
In many CSS programs, customers must pass a credit check and be
deemed creditworthy before being allowed to subscribe to a project. In
some circumstances this can be an important way to reduce a project
owner’s ﬁnancial risk. However, because of the correlation between
credit scores and income, credit screens may also make CSS programs
more inequitable by excluding LMI households. This can be particularly
problematic in CSS programs where customer subscriptions are not
providing a primary source of ﬁnance (in these schemes, favorable
tariﬀs, tax credits, and other incentives are playing the key ﬁnancing
role). Particularly in CSS programs with tariﬀs that are set above or
near retail electricity rates, subscribers may be playing a minimal role
in raising project ﬁnance for CSS projects. In this case, the revenue to
support the CSS tariﬀ is typically borne by ratepayers and taxpayers
(including LMI households), but if LMI households are excluded from
beneﬁtting from the passed-through beneﬁts of solar incentives, in-
equity in CSS schemes may be exacerbated.
The cost for subscribers to participate in CSS program can drama-
tically aﬀect participation levels. Many of the ﬁnancial beneﬁts to
consumers outlined above, and the incentives for developers in third-
party-led utility programs stem from having a rate that credits sub-
scribers favorably for their share of the electricity. In order for CSS
programs to be ﬁnancially attractive propositions, the rate the sub-
scriber pays must be lower than the rate that they are credited (Stanton
and Kline, 2016). However, subscribers may also be motivated by other
considerations, such as positive feelings from supporting green energy
or corporate or community goals.
Political power dynamics continue to play a role in CSS oﬀerings, as
utilities may seek to use CSS programs to maintain their current utility-
customer ﬁnancial relationship and a predictable return for their in-
vestors (Funkhouser et al., 2015; Granqvist and Grover, 2016; Rule,
2014). Further erosion of the utility rate-base by customers self-sup-
plying electricity has led to worries over the “utility death spiral,”
where the utility collects less revenue, drives up rates, inducing more
customers to self-supply their energy, thereby exacerbating the cycle.
3 Value-of-solar tariﬀ schemes seek to set compensation for solar generation equal to
the full value provided by solar generation to the electric system and general public. The
key components of value-of-solar tariﬀs are avoided costs to the utility (e.g. avoided costs
of new capacity), avoided costs to the transmission and distribution system, the costs of
connecting solar to the electric grid, and avoided environmental externalities. (Miller,
2016; Taylor et al., 2015).
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In some schemes, customer must pay for their subscription up-front
or overtime, whether there is a bill credit or line item (on bill) payment,
and if there is a refundable down payment to sign up or not (Chwastyk
and Sterling, 2015). If the up-front ﬁnancing costs are too high, or the
relationship between monthly payments and expected monthly credits
is not balanced correctly, LMI customers may ﬁnd it particularly diﬃ-
cult to purchase a share of a CSS project (Stanton and Kline, 2016). For
these reasons, pay-as-you-go has been viewed by some developers as
easier to set up since it is easier to get customers relative to paying up-
front (Trabish, 2017).
A ﬁnal important consideration in subscriber enrollment is the
composition of institutional subscribers versus residential subscribers.
In some large CSS programs, particularly in IOU utilities, there appears
to be a disconnect between the rhetoric of CSS programs, which often
focus on attracting residential subscribers in a “community,” and the
implementation of CSS programs, which have largely attracted large
institutional subscribers.
2.2. Access and equity in CSS
At the center of the political motivation for CSS program develop-
ment is a normative goal to increase access to solar energy for those
without an adequate roof or ﬁnances. The deﬁnitions of “access,”
however, vary across jurisdictions and actor groups. It can mean access
to electricity where there wasn’t any before, access to ownership of
renewable energy credits, access to the opportunity of owning solar,
and access to the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of owning solar.
One important dimension of CSS program impact is the distribution
of costs and beneﬁts across actor groups. In standard energy infra-
structure investment, costs and beneﬁts are distributed across rate-
payers (e.g. through increased electric rates), taxpayers (e.g. govern-
ment subsidies), and utility shareholders (e.g. through lost proﬁt). The
distribution of costs for standard energy investments has been ex-
tensively studied in the literature under the heading of “cross-sub-
sidization” (Eid et al., 2014; Faulhaber, 1975; Joskow, 1998). More
complex ﬁnancial and policy contexts complicate the analysis of cross-
subsidization, as counterfactual costs and beneﬁts are more diﬃcult to
deﬁne, as there are many existing policies and rules with complex cross-
subsidization eﬀects, on top of which new policies are layered.
Setting aside this analytic complexity, new policy and ﬁnancial
programs add additional conceptual complexity to the analysis of cost
and beneﬁt distribution by introducing third parties, new forms of
ownership, virtual separation of conceptual components of energy
goods (e.g. “green attributes”), and others. In the case of CSS schemes,
the distribution of costs and beneﬁts is made complex by the in-
troduction of third-party solar developers, subscriptions – which take
heterogeneous forms of compensation schemes − and speciﬁc tariﬀ
schemes for electricity generated. The distribution of costs and beneﬁts
raises the issue of fairness in CSS schemes. Because analysis of these
cross-group transfer eﬀects is so complex, CSS programs have been
implemented without a broadly agreed upon ex ante understanding of
these impacts.
In order to not be regressive, CSS schemes should at least provide
LMI customers with access to the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of building new
renewable energy infrastructure in proportion to the costs they bear
through taxes and higher rates (Hoﬀman and High-Pippert, n.d.). In the
United States, LMI customers spend the highest share of their household
income on energy, with estimates ranging from 5 to 10% (Drehobl and
Ross, 2016; Sabol, 2016). In theory, CSS programs, in centralizing
maintenance and ﬁnance to an oﬀsite array, perceivably could mitigate
risk and costs for LMI customers. Using diﬀerent ﬁnancing structures,
hybridized contracts, and recruiting diﬀerent subscriber types, CSS
projects could spread ﬁnancial risk more evenly among its subscribers
(Schroeder et al., 2016). In practice, however, CSS programs are in their
infancy and given the choice, developers have sometimes pursued
wealthier households and large electricity users who pose lower risk of
attrition.
Amid growing interest in increasing participation of LMI customers
in CSS programs, organizations such as the Interstate Renewable Energy
Council (IREC) have released policy recommendations to better include
LMI customers in shared renewable energy projects, though there are
relatively few concrete examples of programs that target LMI customers
(Schroeder et al., 2016). IREC’s recommendations suggest greater
weight be given to the deﬁnitions of who LMI customers are and how
programmatic structures target them, what ﬁnancing mechanisms LMI
customers have access to, and what percentage of total CSS project
capacity LMI customers should subscribe to.
Debates over the fairness and potential cross-subsidies of solar net
metering programs have also spilled into CSS programs. In more gen-
eral solar net metering debates, low-income customers are said to
subsidize higher-income customers who have the money or means to
buy solar panels. Yet as one study determined for a hypothetical
Southwestern electric utility, federal subsidies for the low-income en-
ergy expenditures remain much higher than the potential rate impacts
of solar at even 10% of demand, where net-metered solar was predicted
to increase rates by only 2.5% (Rule, 2014).
3. Discussion
CSS programs are relatively new models for solar energy deploy-
ment and vary signiﬁcantly from state to state and utility to utility
(Coalition for Community Solar Access, 2016; Interstate Renewable
Energy Council, 2016). As such, the performance of CSS programs and
the impact of diﬀerent program design features are not yet well un-
derstood. The heterogeneity in program design has created a critical
opportunity to reﬂect on experience thus far to better understand what
program design options make CSS programs more eﬀective and equi-
table. Moving forward, we are in the implementation stage of a broad
research agenda on CSS programs to learn from the experience in le-
gislated state programs as well as voluntary utility programs. Our re-
search agenda is motivated by several key questions:
• How do CSS programs shift the distribution of costs and beneﬁts in
the deployment of solar energy? To what extent are costs and ben-
eﬁts borne by program participants (CSS subscribers and project
developers), utility shareholders, non-participating utility rate-
payers, and taxpayers? And particularly within the group of parti-
cipating and non-participating ratepayers, how equitable are beneﬁt
and cost transfers from the implementation of CSS programs?
• Who has agency in CSS programs to deploy additional solar energy?
Given the complexity of the real-world policy context in which CSS
programs are deployed, to what extent do CSS programs alter po-
litical and economic power arrangements and to what extent can
participants claim responsibility (or credit) for their eﬀort in de-
ploying solar?
• What explains the heterogeneity in customer participation in CSS
programs, particularly programs with low barriers to entry and at-
tractive ﬁnancial returns? What explains the heterogeneity in CSS
program adoption by electric utilities and state policymakers? What
are the driving factors for CSS program participation and adoption
among these actor groups?
• How do CSS programs compare on diﬀerent evaluation dimensions
(e.g. overall levels of solar deployment, aﬀordability, equity and
access, etc.) to other models of solar deployment, such as mandates
for utility-scale solar or innovative business models for rooftop
solar? What policy and program design options can make CSS pro-
grams more eﬀective and equitable?
We look forward to engaging with the broader research and prac-
titioner communities on these critical questions as state governments,
utilities, and consumers consider if and how to move the community
solar agenda forward.
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